Presentation: July 1, 2024 · Gabriel Collins · 25 slides. How can Ukraine maintain civilian life and industrial activity through repeated disruption of its electricity system? This research guide draws out the presentation’s strategic argument, original evidence, and illustrative economics. The original assessment describes conditions and proposals as of July 2024.
Research guide · Exhibits · Generator economics · Cite this research · Original slides and transcript · Research questions
The strategic case for distributed electricity
The presentation treats reliable electricity as a foundation for civilian life, industrial activity and Ukraine’s ability to endure a long war. Its proposal combines dispersed gas-fired generation, existing fuel infrastructure, replaceable equipment and partial protection against investment losses. The aim is to preserve useful electricity service while damage and repair continue. Performance depends on a connected chain of fuel availability, equipment, networks, operators and financially viable customers. PDF pp. 3, 6, 8.
What the capacity losses reveal
The four facilities identified on page 4 account for 8,422 MW of nameplate capacity: Trypilska, 1,825 MW; Kharkiv CHP-5, 540 MW; Zaporizhzhia nuclear station, 5,700 MW; and Kakhovka, 357 MW. The presentation rounds the total to at least 8.4 GW. Its categories include both destruction and occupation that made generation inaccessible. These figures describe equipment capacity, with actual electricity output depending on operating conditions and availability. PDF pp. 4–5, 15.
The strategic inference is that concentrating a large share of supply in a few facilities makes individual losses consequential. Dispersion reduces the capacity dependent on any one generating unit and can broaden replacement options. The original electricity-trade chart supplies context: the deck reports pre-invasion winter load peaks around 20–22 GW, while acknowledging missing subsequent public load data. Its import balance should therefore be read alongside that limitation when assessing demand and shortages. PDF pp. 4–5, 15.
Original evidence: the electricity trade balance

Why gas features so prominently
The gas argument begins with fuel logistics. Page 12 cites nearly 40,000 kilometres of pipelines and 1,455 gas distribution stations, and proposes using existing industrial connections. The historical energy-use chart suggests that a network developed for much larger consumption might have spare capacity. Collins explicitly identifies an unresolved question: where usable capacity lies relative to cities, factories and power plants. Local delivery capacity, pressure, asset condition and the ability to connect generators still require verification. PDF pp. 11–12.
Original evidence: primary energy use and the gas network

The diesel comparison illustrates scale under a stated efficiency assumption. One gigawatt operating continuously generates 24 GWh per day. At the deck’s assumed 20% thermal efficiency, the fuel heat needed is equivalent to roughly 72,000 barrels of diesel per day. Diesel-generator consumption changes with generator efficiency: an illustrative 40% conversion efficiency would approximately halve that volume. The calculation supports attention to fuel logistics; it does not establish a single fuel requirement for every generator fleet. PDF pp. 9–10, 13.
The proposal also emphasizes globally available turbines and piston-engine generators. The preferred 25–50 MW range reflects industrial requirements in the assessment; smaller sets can serve other loads. Designing connections and operating arrangements to accommodate replacement equipment could make recovery less dependent on scarce parts for older plants. Interchangeability is a design objective whose practical details must be resolved. PDF pp. 9–10, 13.
Affordable equipment and affordable electricity are separate questions
The presentation’s 35 MW example makes the distinction concrete. It assumes a used turbine costing $15 million, 7% financing over ten years, and 7,000 operating hours annually. Fuel uses the deck’s historical $21.30/MMBtu TTF benchmark, with additional operating costs assumed at 15% of fuel expenditure. The figures below reproduce the source scenario; the final row rounds its result for readability. PDF p. 21.
| Item | Source assumption or result |
|---|---|
| Used equipment purchase | $15 million |
| Annual operation and output | 7,000 hours; 245,000 MWh |
| Gas consumption | 9,688 m³/hour; 67.816 million m³/year |
| Gas price and conversion | $21.30/MMBtu; 27.3 m³/MMBtu |
| Annual fuel expense | Approximately $52.9 million |
| Equipment capital recovery | $8.53/MWh |
| Fuel plus 15% operating allowance | $248.36/MWh |
| Total after 10% markup | Approximately $283/MWh, or $0.283/kWh |
Calculation note: monthly amortization reproduces the displayed capital-recovery charge. The source’s “10% profit margin” is mathematically a 10% markup on cost. Recalculation gives $282.58/MWh, compared with the slide’s $282.57; this rounding difference does not change the interpretation. The example does not separately itemize every installation, connection, insurance or other project expense.
Original evidence: the 35 MW generator scenario

Under these assumptions, operating costs represent about 96.7% of the total before markup. Fuel price and utilization therefore strongly affect the outcome. The result is a scenario rather than an observed consumer tariff. PDF pp. 14, 21.
What a replacement guarantee could accomplish
The proposed guarantee addresses a specific obstacle: exposure to the loss of generating equipment. The presentation hypothesizes that acceptable electricity buyers and US coverage of 40–45% of replacement value could attract private investors. At $1 million per MW and 45% coverage, $1 billion could cover the specified share of replacement value for approximately 2.22 GW of equipment. The same arithmetic gives 13.33 GW for $6 billion; the deck illustrates a rounded-down 12 GW. PDF pp. 20, 22.
This measures capacity associated with a replacement-value guarantee. Investors still need upfront capital, workable fuel contracts, grid arrangements and customers able to pay. A program’s fiscal exposure also depends on claim frequency, repeated losses, coverage terms and reimbursement arrangements. Those details remain outside the presentation’s simplified calculation. Partial risk coverage could improve investment conditions, while affordability and commercial viability require their own solutions. PDF pp. 20, 22.
The implementation agenda
The presentation closes with questions about consumer prices and subsidies, existing supply contracts, industrial self-generation, surplus sales and operator training. It also raises the possibility of expanding Ukrainian manufacturing. These are central parts of an electricity strategy: equipment must become dependable service supported by institutions, skills and revenue. The longer-term suggestion of replacing gas units with lower-emission technologies preserves an option for future planning; small modular nuclear substitution remains an aspiration whose technical compatibility must be established. PDF pp. 8, 22–23.
Cite this research
The presentation is dated July 1, 2024; the Portal post was published July 2. Page references in this guide count the title page as PDF page 1.
Chicago bibliography: Collins, Gabriel. “An Electricity Strategy for Long War in Ukraine.” Presentation, July 1, 2024. https://collinsresearchportal.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/collins_distributed-electricity-for-ukraine_1-july-2024.pdf.
Example Chicago note: Gabriel Collins, “An Electricity Strategy for Long War in Ukraine” (presentation, July 1, 2024), 21, https://collinsresearchportal.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/collins_distributed-electricity-for-ukraine_1-july-2024.pdf#page=21.
Read these works together
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Full Presentation here
Original slides and transcript
The original July 1, 2024 presentation and its full transcript remain below, including the author’s disclosures and beta-assessment caveat. Numerical statements and forecasts retain the date and assumptions of that source.
Full text of the slides (from the PDF)
Slide 1. An Electricity
Strategy for Long
War in Ukraine
Gabriel Collins, J.D.
1 July 2024
Note: readers should consider these slides a “beta version” assessment of a rapidly evolving situation and set of challenges. If I have information that looks dated, inaccurate, or otherwise suggests I need to update my thinking, please contact me and I will be happy to speak with you and alter the deck as may be warranted.
Slide 2. Disclaimer & Disclosure
This analysis reflects personal opinions and assessments only. It is designed solely to be illustrative and stimulate broader thought, with the objective of elevating the conversation in the energy and water space. It IS NOT an investment analysis or investment advice. It is also NOT offering any legal opinions or advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship with any reader or consumer of the information presented herein. Readers rely on the information in this analysis at their own risk.
Neither the author nor the Baker Institute for Public Policy are liable for any loss or damage caused by a reader’s reliance on information contained in any of the charts, data series, opinions, or other information presented herein. The information and opinions contained in, and expressed by this analysis, are based on sources deemed reliable. However, there is no warranty, assurance, or guarantee, express or implied, about the completeness, reliability, or accuracy of this content. The views expressed herein are my interpretations as of the date the report is published and are subject to change without notice.
Note: Industry experts with more detailed domain knowledge are likely to offer feedback. As they do, estimates and assessments will be revised and refined.
DISCLAIMER: The opinions expressed in this briefing are those of the author alone and do not represent those of any other organizations with which he has been, or is currently, affiliated.
Slide 3. Executive Summary
• Ukraine cannot win a long war without basic, resilient electricity supplies. People cannot live and industrial activity cannot resume without electrons. Both are mutually reinforcing and necessary for victory.
• Current power system offers an irresistible and high “return per shot” for a Russian long-range strike complex capable of ranging all of Ukraine with cruise missiles and drones and a substantial portion with ballistic missiles, especially if able to launch from Belarus.
• Just like Ukraine cannot wait for 155mm artillery shells, so too it cannot wait for electrons. No time for “ideal” solutions. “Good enough” is name of the game.
• Ukraine’s military survived Russia’s early onslaught and successfully resisted in part because commanders dispersed forces before Russian strikes at war’s outset. Now, dispersion logic is also needed for the power sector.
• Gas turbine gensets whose replacement cost is partially ensured by the US Government are core to the solution.
• They can be fueled from a world-class existing gas pipeline system, widely spread out, and emplaced in affordable, hardened revetments to maximize Russian munitions requirements and put Russian strike operations “on the wrong side of economics and physics.”
Slide 4. Over-Centralization Creates Extreme Vulnerability
Трипільська ТЕС, Destroyed
April 2024, -1,825 MW
Харківська ТЕЦ-5, Destroyed
March 2024, -540 MW
Каховська ГЕС, Destroyed
June 2023, -357 MW
Запорізька АЕС, Temporarily
Occupied, -5,700 MW
• Current Ukraine dispatchable power base provides concentrated, high-payoff aimpoints for Russian munitions
• $25-$30 million of munitions can destroy a power plant that provides 5% of Ukraine’s power and would cost billions to replace one-for-one
To date, at least 8.4 GW of nameplate electricity generation capacity destroyed/rendered inaccessible by Russian kinetic actions
Slide 5. Rising Ukraine Electricity Imports Reflect Impact of Russian Strikes
Ukraine Electricity Import Balance (Hourly, GW) (2018-Present)
Source: ENTSO-E, Author’s Analysis
• From the end of 2014 through late 2021, Ukraine’s daily electricity load typically peaked each winter at 20-22 GW.
• Russia’s 2022 invasion cut the number roughly in half.
• There are not public load data since then, making it difficult to assess what recovery, if any, has occurred.
• The bottom line is that Russian strikes have severely impacted the Ukrainian electricity system.
• Absent rapid and decisive action, this winter threatens a major humanitarian crisis in Ukraine. This is likely a core Russian objective as Moscow seeks to destroy
Ukraine’s social cohesion and support in neighboring countries that Ukrainian refugees might flee to.
Slide 6. Russian Strikes Could Continue For Years
• Ukraine’s power grid does not just face threats from Russia alone.
• Russia is the “shooter”, but its military is accessing at least four military industrial bases:
China’s (many types of materials), Iran’s (drones), North
Korea’s (munitions including ballistic missiles), and Russia’s own.
• Speaking bluntly, the threat of drone and missile strikes on electricity system infrastructure will be persistent and large-scale.
• Air defense alone will not be sufficient.
• Physical system restructuring through dispersion and hardening will be critical to Ukraine’s economic and national survival.
Slide 7. Possible Solution: Distributed
Power Leveraging Ukraine’s
Massive Gas Pipeline Network
Slide 8. Distributed Power Footprint Facilitates Industrial
Revival and Protects People
• Increases Russia’s targeting burden by an order of magnitude
• More affordable replacement of inevitable attrition of power generation assets
• Allows Ukraine to allocate more of its air defense systems to population centers and the front lines of fighting
• Longer term, creates connection points where natural gas units can be replaced with small modular nuclear reactors.
• Save lives first while restoring economic activity, set stage for “drop in” emissions reduction activities later.
Slide 9. Key Tenet One: Leverage Gas Piston-Engine and Turbine Gensets
• Affordable
• 1-10MW systems are too small for key industrial applications. 25-50MW unit size offers better optionality for supplying civilian and industrial applications.
• Wide-second hand availability, far more diverse supplier array than is the case for Soviet-era power plant equipment
• Can design system for turbine genset fungibility—i.e. if the GE turbine gets blown up, can drop in a Rolls Royce unit
• Can access a global supply chain and reservoir of operational expertise for gas turbine power generation.
• Turbines and piston-engine gensets are roughly “right-sized” to use plentiful gas supply spur lines that are already connected to industrial facilities in Ukraine.
Slide 10. Why is Natural Gas Foundational to Ukraine’s Electricity Security?
• 1 Gigawatt of generation capacity running for a 24-hour day generates 24 GWh of electricity.
• In raw heat terms, 1 GWh = 102,359 M^3 of natural gas. (https://unit-converter.gasunie.nl/)
• Adjusting for 20% simple cycle turbine thermal efficiency means
511,795 M^3 of gas used per GWh generated.
• 1 M^3 of gas = 9.77 kWh or 9.77 kWh * 3412 BTU/kWh = 33,335
BTU. Diesel fuel contains approximately 137,000 BTU/gallon, meaning that a gallon of diesel is the energy equivalent of 4.1 M^3 of gas. Thus, 511,795 M^3 of gas/4.1 M^3 gas per gal of diesel =
125,000 gal of diesel or about 3,000 bbl of diesel.
• Thus 24 GWh * 3,000 bbl of diesel = approx. 72,000 barrels of diesel per day per GW.
• With over 8 GW of generation capacity offline, the volumes of diesel to even partially compensate are probably logistically impossible to supply.
• Diesel also likely costs 3-4X as much per unit of fuel energy as natural gas does.
• This means natural gas is extremely important for any plan to provide Ukraine with dispersed, dispatchable electricity generation in the near-term.
Major expansion of diesel-based generation would blow out Ukraine’s import bills…
Slide 11. Ukraine’s Gas System Overbuild Relative to Current Demand
Suggests Latent Potential to Support Distributed Generation
Ukraine Primary Energy Use, TWh (1985-2023)
Source: Energy Institute Statistical Yearbook 2024, Author’s Analysis
• I do not presently know how much of the gas distribution & transport capacity runs to cities versus industrial facilities and power plants.
• But I suspect there is sufficient geospatial correlation that underused/unused pipe capacity would offer ready distributed generation opportunities.
• Latent potential of system overcapacity also suggests that so long as there are sufficient compressor station spare parts, it will be reasonably resilient against
Russian strikes.
Slide 12. Key Tenet Two: Leverage Existing Gas Transport
Network and Offtake Connections
• UkrTransGaz claims operation of nearly 40,000 km of gas pipelines and 1,455 gas distribution stations.
• Past research has also suggested that Ukraine has 100,000 boilers deployed around the country, with at least half of boilers using gas as a fuel.
• This in turn suggests widespread availability of industrial gas connections.
• Data from a major Ukrainian boiler manufacturer shows that the hourly gas consumption of an industrial boiler making 2.5 tonnes of steam per hour is about the same as what’s needed to run a 1 MW piston-engine genset.
Slide 13. Distributed Generation Options’ Est. Natural Gas Use
Manufacturer Unit Type Output_MW Frequency (Hz) BTU/kWh @ 100% Load BTU/MWh @ 100% Load MMBTU of gas/hr CF/gas/hr M^3 gas/hr Source
Cat GE3412 Piston 0.5 60 10,595 10,595,000 5 5,298 154 https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/Caterpillar/CM2022
0105-e8e3b-4362f
Rolls-Royce MTU 8V4000 Piston 1 50/60 7,803,244 8 7,803 227 https://www.mtusolutions.com/eu/en/applications/powergeneration/power-generation-products/gas-generatorsets/natural-gas-generator-sets/gas-powered-series4000.html
Capstone C1000S Turbine 1 50/60 – – 11 11,400 332 https://www.capstoneengineered.com/wpcontent/uploads/2023/04/C1000S-High-PressureNatural-Gas.pdf
GE LM2500 DLE (Simple-Cycle) Turbine 22.7 9,501 9,501,000 216 215,673 6,283 https://www.gevernova.com/content/dam/gepower/glob al/en_US/documents/gas/gas-turbines/aero-productsspecs/lm2500-60hz-fact-sheet-productspecifications.pdf
Slide 14. Distributed Genset Basic Capital Cost Per MW
• Turbine unit price/hours scatter plot
• Show genset cost vs mw of output
Gas Turbine Gensets Natgas Piston-Engine Gensets
Source: Machinio, Other Equipment Vendors, Author’s Analysis
Capital Cost for Utility-Scale Generation Options: 4 X 54 MW aeroderivative simple cycle ($1.6 million per MW), 1 X 735 MW ultra-supercritical coal ($4.1 million per MW), 6 X 80 MW SMR Nuclear ($8.9 million per MW)
Source: https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/powerplants/capitalcost/pdf/capital_cost_AEO2025.pdf
Slide 15. Distributed Power Footprint Also Strains Russian Strike Economics
11 missiles ($25-30 million’ worth) destroyed 1,825 MW of centralized generation capacity worth billions of USD.
~$16,500 per MW destroyed
Trypilska TES ~0.7 km^2
Imagine instead Russian targeters having to find and destroy 50-100 gas turbine gensets(20-40 MW apiece) scattered around
Ukraine.
Munitions requirements rise by 50-fold or more, if 1-2 munitions tasked per asset. This means using the same types of missiles could now cost $100,000 or more per MW of generation capacity destroyed.
And of critical importance, the world has substantial supplies of piston engine and turbine gas-fired generators as well as hot manufacturing lines. This breaks Ukraine’s dependence on trying to scrounge old Soviet power plant parts to repair Russian strike damage.
Slide 16. Distributed Facilities Can Also Be Protected More Easily
By US Air Force from USA – 130815-F-MF529-068, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=50925653 https://media.defense.gov/2010/Feb/09/2000396191/-1/-1/0/100201-F-0168M279.JPG
Why do these pictures of concrete revetments and hardened aircraft shelters show F-16s? Hint—it’s not because
Ukraine’s Air Force will receive some this year. Rather, it’s because an LM2500 gas turbine genset pack and an F-16 have broadly similar dimensions. (both fit within 16m long X 10m wide X 5 m tall)
Concrete shielding would require Russian forces to expend even more munitions while also facilitating decoy campaign
Slide 17. Decoys Can Further Challenge the Russian ReconStrike Complex and Munitions Stocks
• $1,000 decoys can attract $1 million+ missiles
• If Ukrainian firms can make decoys of HIMARS rocket launchers, artillery, MIG-29s, etc, they can certainly make decoy generator sets
• Source: https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2023/09/ 11/world/ukraine-russia-decoyweapons-intl/index.html, https://www.usni.org/magazines/pro ceedings/2024/april/decoy-warfarelessons-and-implication-warukraine
Slide 18. Dispersed Targets Will Likely Increase Russian Reliance on Drones
• Ukraine has gotten good at countering long-range Shahed kamikaze drones with innovative ISR approaches (like listening systems) coupled with gun-based mobile fire teams.
• For the price of a single NASAMS or PATRIOT missile interceptor, Ukraine can likely create somewhere between
15 and 50 mobile fire gun trucks with thermal sights and heavy machine guns.
• Missile interceptors are expensive and Ukraine will be competing for supplies with US forces themselves, Israel, Taiwan, and other customers.
• Gun ammunition on the other hand is plentiful. A single plant can produce 24 million rounds per year of 12.7 X 99 mm NATO machine gun cartridges (https://ammoinc.com/2022/10/12/ammo-inc-new-plantmanufacturing-50-bmg-m33-high-accuracy-ammunition/)
• And unlike single use missiles, the trucks can engage targets over and over.
These trucks cost about as much as 2 NASAMS missiles
Source: https://mil.in.ua/en/news/mobile-aa-fire-teams-received-pickup-trucks-fromthe-come-back-alive-foundation-and-ukrnafta/ https://en.defenceua.com/news/russia_changes_tactics_of_strikes_on_ ukraine_reducing_use_of_shahed_drones-10388.html
Slide 19. How to Incentivize Partners’
Investment in Ukraine Distributed
Gas-Fired Generation
Hint: Assurances Needed
Slide 20. Key Facilitator: US Government Economic Guarantees
• Hypothesis: Private parties will be willing to work in Ukraine on this effort is (1) they can find acceptable offtake counterparties and (2) if the USG underwrites 40-45% of equipment replacement value if assets installed under the project are damaged by Russian action (kinetic strikes, cyberattack, or sabotage)
• How many turbines can be replaced for the cost of a Patriot air defense missile battery (i.e. $1 billion)?
• At USD 1 million per MW, USG can underwrite more than 2 Gigawatts of generation capacity (assuming 45% replacement value underwrite).
• This means 10% of the recent Ukraine aid package (a/k/a $6 billion) could potentially underwrite installation of 12 GW of generation capacity.
• In simplest terms, this strongly suggests the US could de-risk private power investment in Ukraine for years to come.
• Over time, as the system becomes more distributed, the underwrite risk decreases because Russia’s rate of return from strikes on power plants diminishes.
Slide 21. “Back of Envelope” Asset-Level Economics
TM2500 Gas turbine genset (Used, 4,000 hrs):
35MW, $15 million purchase price, 7% interest rate, 10-year payback
Run 350 days/yr, 20 hrs/day = 245,000 MWh/yr.
Capital Cost = $2,089,944/yr or $8.53/MWh http://insupplyco.com/products-tm2500.php#tab-1 9,688 M^3/gas/hr X 7,000 hrs/yr = 67,816,000
M^3 total gas use/yr
@27.3 M^3 per MMBTU and TTF gas at $21.3/MMBTU trailing 24-mo average = $52.9 million/year in fuel cost
$52.9 million/245,000 MWh generated plus
15% misc costs
Operating Cost = $248.36/MWh
Capital Cost ($8.53/MWh) + Operating Cost ($248.36/MWh) + 10% Profit Margin = $282.57/MWh or $0.28/kWh
Slide 22. Key Questions
• What will power costs to consumers look like? Will Ukraine govt/foreign partners need to potentially subsidize? How much will this cost?
• Can these new generating assets be rolled into existing power supply agreements? If not, how hard is it to restructure contracts?
• How do Ukrainian electricity providers think about a situation where more large industrial consumers build “behind the meter” generation and potentially sell surplus electricity back onto the grid?
• What does the “operational expertise tipping point” look like? Right now, US firms, especially in the oilfield services space, have deep expertise in operating distributed power assets under austere, near-war conditions in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Nigeria. Ukrainian personnel will need upfront training but it makes sense to indigenize operations as quickly as possible.
• As time evolves, Ukrainian firms can also likely produce the types of turbines needed.
Slide 23. Ukrainian Self-Production of Gas Turbines: A Long and Successful History
Thousands of units built
And knowledge & experience building hundreds of units like the ones needed for distributed generation
Perhaps build first Zorya
Mashproekt international plant in Poland or Romania to supply
Ukraine market during war?
Slide 24. Additional Facility Hardening Options
• Go Underground
• 800 MW gas-fired plant built underground in Seoul
• Constructed underneath an older, now decommissioned plant built on the surface.
• The new plant is built 25 meters underground.
• That depth is likely beyond the reach of virtually all Russian standoff strike munitions aside from the relatively scarce Iskander SRBM and Kinzhal ALBM. https://www.powermag.com/korean-utility-plans-first-underground-combined-cycle-power-plant/
Slide 25. Thank You!
Original executive summary
- Ukraine’s success in the war and its economic revival in years to come are contingent upon reliable electricity supplies.
- The centralized power system is highly vulnerable to Russian strikes, which can cause significant disruptions.
- Ukraine cannot afford to wait for perfect solutions; practical and immediate measures are necessary.
- Similar to military strategies, dispersion is crucial for the power sector to minimize the impact of enemy strikes.
- Ukraine should adopt a distributed power strategy leveraging gas turbine gensets to ensure resilient and reliable electricity supplies.
- International support and investment, particularly from the US, are critical for the success of this strategy.
Research questions
What does distributed electricity mean in this analysis?
The July 2024 proposal spreads gas-fired generation across more, smaller units and combines it with fuel access, replacement equipment and operating capability. The objective is to sustain civilian and industrial electricity service despite repeated disruption. PDF pp. 8–9, 22–23.
Does the diesel comparison apply to every generator?
The roughly 72,000-barrel-per-day figure for one continuous gigawatt is a fuel-energy-equivalence illustration using 20% thermal efficiency. A different generator efficiency changes the fuel requirement. PDF p. 10.
Is approximately $0.28 per kWh an observed Ukrainian tariff?
It is the result of the deck’s illustrative 35 MW used-turbine case, including its historical gas-price input and operating-hours assumptions. The displayed calculation adds a 10% markup to cost. PDF p. 21.
What would the proposed U.S. guarantee cover?
The presentation hypothesizes coverage of 40–45% of equipment replacement value after specified war-related losses. It distinguishes this risk-sharing proposal from the electricity contracts, financing and operating arrangements a project would also require. PDF pp. 20, 22.





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