When the mercury falls, the energy war heats up
As Russia’s war against Ukraine approaches its 5th winter, the accumulated historical dataset suggests Russia will once again make energy infrastructure a priority target. Indeed, Russia’s Defense Ministry recently threatened “…massive attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure,” framing this as a “response” to Ukraine’s campaign against the Russian refining and oil sector.
While the reasoning and rationale are twisted—unsurprising from a Kremlin that launched Europe’s largest and bloodiest war since World War II—such Blackout Warfare is congruent with Russia’s doctrine.[i] Moscow seeks to maximize the suffering of civilians to break Ukrainian society’s will to resist and compensate for Kremlin forces’ mediocre battlefield performance.
Russia’s capacity to escalate energy attacks credibly exists, history establishes that the will is there, and Russian armies’ lack of advance provides the motive. Bring those three elements—capacity, intent, and motive—together and the confluence portends a tough winter. Except this time around, the pain is likely to be more mutual than it was during any of the prior four winters of this terrible war. Here are 3 escalations and responses that civil defenders, energy risk managers, and military planners should expect.
1. Russia uses its Iskander-1000 ballistic missiles to destroy Ukrainian power plants and key grid infrastructure.
Ukraine’s depleted stocks of Patriot, S-300, and SAMP-T air defense missiles capable of intercepting ballistic missiles has opened a window of opportunity for Russia. From forward launch positions near Kursk, Russia’s legacy Iskander short-range ballistic missiles can range most of Ukraine on and east of the Dnipro River. Russian forces have now begun using an enhanced version of the Iskander, with a larger propellant section and other components the same.
The new missile, dubbed Iskander-1000, is believed to have a range of approximately 1,000km, giving it the ability to range virtually all of Ukraine and deliver highly destructive 480-700kg warheads. Furthermore, Ukrainian military intelligence alleges that Russia has taken delivery of additional North Korean ballistic missiles, including the KN-30, which can carry a warhead three times larger than the Iskander variants described above. These vehicles’ explosive power plus the supersonic (or even hypersonic) kinetic energy they pack means they can inflict the type of damage that takes energy facilities offline for months with a single strike.
Ukraine’s traditional thermal power plants and large bulk power substations will be highly vulnerable to these threats, even if they are hardened with concrete blast walls and other protective measures.
2. Dynamic drone targeting threatens distributed generation assets in Ukraine.
One of Ukraine’s biggest adaptations to Russia strikes on large, fixed power plants has been to adopt a distributed power generation model. As we wrote in 2024, this put the Russians on the wrong end of targeting economics and physics. Unfortunately, Russian targeting and munitions capabilities have evolved such that smaller and even moving targets can now be struck.
Russia has for months demonstrated the ability to target moving trains with drones in some parts of Ukraine. It has now also done so more recently with jet-powered Shahed drones near Odesa, adding a new level of danger. Here is how railroad rolling stock relates to distributed power generation assets: (1) a railcar or locomotive is about the same size as many cogeneration and mobile gas turbine units and (2) Russian forces have been able to establish dynamic targeting capabilities sufficient to locate moving trains and guide munitions onto them. If these surveillance and reconnaissance assets also incorporate thermal imaging, power generation units will stand out—especially during winter.
This means that in some areas closer to the battlefront or Russian border—such as Kharkiv, Kherson, Odesa, Dnipro, and Zaporizhia—provision of heat and electricity at utility scale during the winter could be seriously imperiled.
3. Ukraine systematically targets the Russian power grid.
For Russia’s first four winter campaigns of Blackout Warfare, political and military circumstances kept Ukraine from responding in kind against the Russian power grid. That could change this winter. U.S. pressure is no longer the restraining force it was in 2022-2024 and Ukraine has a powerful and continually improving long-range strike complex.
Furthermore, if shortages of ballistic missile interceptors amplify damage Russia can inflict to Ukraine’s electricity system this winter, Kyiv will face commensurate domestic political pressure to retaliate against the Russian grid. A long history of campaigns against electricity infrastructure during wars suggests that it rarely triggers capitulation. In Ukraine’s case, the population’s resilience and fierce warrior spirit make retaliation the more probable outcome.
If that path plays out, my mapping indicates that roughly 75% of Russia’s dispatchable electricity generation capacity (i.e. coal, gas, and nuclear power) sits within 2,000km of Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. Half of Russia’s dispatchable power station capacity sits within 1,000km of the Ukrainian border. And more than 25% is within 500km.
The point of those distance gradations is that Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated a capacity to successfully strike targets throughout Russia to distances of 2,000km and beyond. Finally, January temperatures steadily fall the further east one goes. Moscow is colder than Kyiv, Nizhniy Novgorod is colder than Moscow, and the West Siberian industrial cities are colder still. All would be dangerous places to be left without power during the depths of winter.
If Kyiv launched a campaign against the Russian grid in response to Blackout Warfare by Moscow, the Kremlin would face stark choices in how it distributed air defense assets between defense plants, oil & gas facilities, and power plants and key substations. The physics of that equation would open substantial additional gaps for Ukrainian strike forces to exploit and bring the war home to Russians in a war that the Ukrainians have now themselves lived for almost 5 years.
Conclusion
This winter is likely to be the most challenging yet for Ukraine’s energy security. Russia’s commitment to Blackout Warfare remains the same as it was last winter and before. What has changed is that Russia continues ramping up production of strike systems, while depleted Ukrainian (and Western) missile interceptor inventories mean that Russian ballistic missiles with large warheads are much more likely to make it through to targets. If there is a large, fixed energy asset that cannot be repositioned underground or shielded by concrete, it will be very hard to defend.
But Russia is also now much more vulnerable. Ukrainian strike forces can now credibly reach targets anywhere in Western Russia, and with the country’s longest-ranged munitions, objectives in and even beyond, the Ural Mountains. This matters greatly in the energy space because it means that most of Russia’s electricity production capacity is now within range of Ukrainian forces. To boot, Ukraine is also boosting the production of indigenous strike drones and missiles and within months, is likely to field its own ballistic missiles able to reach the Moscow area.
Both countries can now strike energy infrastructure at industrial scale over multiple months. Electricity, gas, and oil systems are all targetable. This winter will be tough for both combatants and the risks of secondary escalation driven by energy infrastructure targeting are at their highest point since the war began.
Suggested Citation: Gabriel Collins, “3 Winter Energy Escalations to Watch Between Russia and Ukraine,” The Sinews of Civilization, Substack, 1 September 2026. https://gabrielcollins.substack.com/p/3-winter-energy-escalations-to-watch
[i] Gabriel Collins and Igor Khrestin, “Russia’s Blackout Warfare Needs a U.S. Counter,” Foreign Policy, December 11, 2025. https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/12/11/ukraine-blackout-energy-russia-deterrent/
Leave a Reply