US LNG Is a National Security Asset

The United States’ rich domestic energy resource base and the industrious drillers, financiers, and service company folks that bring those molecules to market play a critical national security role. Unlike most other major global suppliers, LNG cargoes leaving US ports are purely the product of private enterprise by a supply web counting thousands of firms. But the flow is a national asset nonetheless.

Gas is emerging as the bridge between the energy portfolio of today, that of 2030, and that of 2050 and beyond. It is the most powerful force humanity has found yet for displacing coal use and setting the energy economy on a structurally lower-emissions path.

Gas is a geoeconomic force multiplier. US gas helps chip away at coal use in China. It also empowers American manufacturers through lower energy costs. American gas abundance also helps insulate our friends and partners abroad from Russian energy coercion.

Regardless of one’s ideological persuasion, it is likely to remain a centerpiece of American (and global) energy security for a long-time to come. And there is likely even more and better to come. By 2028, US LNG exporters could plausibly have the capacity to put considerably more gas into the global market than Russia’s Europe-bound pipelines did before Moscow’s ongoing war against Ukraine.

Further Reading

–Steven Miles and Anna Mikulska, “Who’s To Blame For Exorbitant Natural Gas Prices In Europe? Hint: Maybe Not Who You Think,” Commentary, 26 October 2022, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/whos-blame-exorbitant-natural-gas-prices-europe-hint-maybe-not-who-you-think

–Gabriel Collins, Anna Mikulska, and Steven Miles. 2022. Winning the Long War in Ukraine Requires Gas Geoeconomics. Research paper no. 08.25.22. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas. https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/winning-long-war-ukraine-requires-gas-geoeconomics-0

–Miles, Steven R. and Gabriel Collins. 2022. A Bridge Over Troubled Water: LNG FSRUs Can Enhance European Energy Security. Issue brief no. 03.29.22. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas. https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/a-bridge-over-troubled-water-lng-fsrus-can-enhance-european-energy-security

–Gabriel Collins, Kenneth B. Medlock III, Anna Mikulska, Steven R. Miles, “Strategic Response Options if Russia Cuts Gas Supplies to Europe,” 11 February 2022, Baker Institute Research Paper, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/strategic-response-options-if-russia-cuts-gas-supplies-europe

–Collins, Gabriel and Anna Mikulska. 2021. Gas Geoeconomics: A Strategy to Harden European Partners Against Russian Energy Coercion. Policy brief: Recommendations for the New Administration. 02.12.21. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas. https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/gas-geoeconomics-strategy-harden-european-partners-against-russian-energy-coercion

Holding The Line Against China’s Revisionist Threat: The Next 12 Years

A Strategy to Offset China’s Revisionist Actions and Sustain a Rules-Based Order in the Asia-Pacific

This slide deck has been evolving over the past couple of years and the ongoing set of actions by the PRC only re-emphasizes the importance of many of the policy items mentioned therein.

Full slide deck downloadable here

Based On: Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hold The Line through 2035: A Strategy to Offset China’s Revisionist Actions and Sustain a Rules-Based Order in the Asia-Pacific,” Houston, TX: Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 12 November 2020, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/1e07d836/ces-pub-asiapacific-111120.pdf  

a gas geoeconomics strategy in Europe should focus on 4 main geographic corridors. In at least two cases, it can utilize infrastructure and right of way paths that already operate.

Will France Unlock the Door to an Iberian Express Gas Pipeline?

The Nord Stream explosions emphasize that Europe faces a multi-year gas and energy crisis. An “Iberian Express” gas pipeline would help permanently offset lost Russian supplies by linking Spanish (and perhaps also Portuguese) LNG terminals to gas-starved Germany and Central Europe. Pipeline expansions/newbuilds could be rapidly executed–perhaps in less than a year–but require French consent, which Paris has thus far withheld.

Spain and Portugal offer long coastlines exposed to the open Atlantic, are relatively distant from Russian naval power (unlike the Baltic and Black Seas), and have installed LNG terminal capacity far exceeding local demand. They also lack high-volume trunk gas pipelines connecting them to the rest of Europe. Data from CEDIGAZ covering most of the past decade suggest that collectively, LNG terminals in Southern Europe (primarily Portugal and Spain) could take in 30-40 billion cubic meters (BCM) more gas than they actually handle each year. Adding the previously mothballed El Musel facility along the Bay of Biscay coast would add another 8 BCM/year to the total.[i]

Gas Wants to Come in But is Bottlenecked Due to Insufficient Pipeline Connectivity to Rest of Europe

Source: Reuters

As we pointed out in 2018, the Iberian corridor offers low-hanging fruit for increasing secure gas supplies to Europe. Unlike in 2018, Europe now faces a gas security challenge under conditions of wartime intensity. The EU—perhaps with US support—should thus urgently fund an “Iberian Express Pipeline” to link the Iberian Peninsula’s gas import facilities more tightly with the remainder of Europe. Two complementary possibilities exist.

The first would entail completing the MidCat pipeline between Catalonia and southern France, which could add 7.5 BCM/yr of cross-border capacity (for a total of approximately 15 BCM). Notably, the powerful Foment de Treball business lobby voiced enthusiastic support for MidCat in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with its president saying that “Spain can be a ‘gas hub’ of Europe.”[ii] Multiple left-leaning Spanish political constituencies, including the Socialist Workers’ Party, People’s Party, and the Citizens Party express support for the pipeline, but appear to take the view that it should be used to move green hydrogen.[iii] Green hydrogen is not currently produced at industrial scale in the pipeline’s catchment area and questions thus remain about the degree of political support in Spain for finishing MidCat and using it for natural gas. Russia’s actions have put the project back into play but its potential within the next 2-3 years remains unclear and is amplified by the need to improve pipeline infrastructure on the MidCat corridor’s French side.

Exigency created by Russia’s gas embargo thus suggests other routes—even if longer and more expensive—should also be pursued. One of the more sensible potential routes would run offshore along Spain’s northern coast with spur lines from each LNG terminal, make landfall along Brittany’s Bay of Biscay coast and run onwards to the Zeebrugge, Belgium area. The route would be approximately 1,600km long and would create a market linkage between Iberian import facilities and the well-connected hub zone of Northwest Europe. Spare Iberian gas could displace imports of North Sea supplies and render them available for buyers in Germany (a virtual expansion via molecule displacement through existing infrastructure). Gas from northern Spain into NW Europe could, through displacement, also potentially permit expansion of supplies through the Baltic Pipe corridor into Poland and other areas deep in eastern Europe.

Such pipelines normally entail a formidable planning and construction timetable. For instance, the subsea 1,224 kilometer (km) Nord Stream-1 project required approximately six years to plan, build, and bring into full service.[iv] But there is a precedent for building major pipelines faster under wartime conditions. During World War II, submarine attacks badly disrupted tanker shipments of oil from Texas to the Northeast. In response, a public-private partnership constructed the two pipelines of approximately 2,000 km in length each—the “Big Inch” that carried crude oil and the “Little Big Inch” that carried refined products. Each line was planned and constructed in less than two years.

While the “Big Inch” projects were built nearly 80 years ago, the historical analogy remains relevant to the contemporary gas security challenge Europe now faces. American Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes remarked in 1940 that “building of a crude pipeline from Texas to the East might not be economically sound, but in the event of an emergency it might be absolutely necessary.”[v] Then the Nazi war machine rapidly turned the option into a strategic necessity for America’s oil industry in the early 1940s, just as Russian revanchist actions in 2022 now do for European gas consumers.

While we do not yet know the full extent of long-term benefits an Iberian Express project might bring, the “Big Inch” experience suggests at least two. To start, it helped the Allies win the war. As historian Keith Miller put it, “Without the prodigious delivery of oil from the US, this global war, quite frankly, could never have been won.”[vi] While the energy pathways to victory are somewhat different today, the broad concept of energy abundance underpinning successful containment and defeat of a foe still holds fast today. In addition, the pipeline corridors established eight decades ago through decisive, rapid action by a public-private partnership remain in service today to the benefit of American consumers and industry. European officials should draw inspiration from the “Big Inch” initiative’s success.

Additional reading

–Collins, Gabriel, Anna Mikulska, and Steven Miles. 2022. Winning the Long War in Ukraine Requires Gas Geoeconomics. Research paper no. 08.25.22. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas. 

–Gabriel Collins, Anna Mikulska, and Steven Miles, “Gas Geoeconomics Essential to Win
the ‘Long War’ In Ukraine—And Asia
,” Baker Institute Research Presentation, September 2022


[i] “El Musel LNG Terminal,” Global Energy Monitor Wiki, https://www.gem.wiki/El_Musel_LNG_Terminal.

[ii] “Foment proposes reviving the Midcat and making Spain a gas hub of southern Europe,” (Foment propone resucitar el Midcat y que España sea ‘hub’ gasístico del sur de Europa), El Confidencial, 1 March 2022, https://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2022-02-28/la-patronal-catalana-propone-que-espana-se-convierta-en-hub-gasistico-del-sur-de-europa_3383706/  

[iii] “The Socialist Workers’ Party, People’s Party, and Citizens’ Party agree to promote the Midcat gas pipeline to France and use it to transport green hydrogen,” (PSOE, PP y Cs pactan impulsar el gasoducto Midcat con Francia y usarlo para hidrógeno verde), EPE, 11 May 2022, https://www.epe.es/es/economia/20220511/psoe-pp-cs-impulsar-midcat-francia-hidrogeno-verde-13644202

[iv] “Nord Stream by the Numbers,” Nord Stream AG, https://www.nord-stream.com/the-project/construction/.

[v] Keith Martin, “The Big Inch: Fueling America’s WWII War Effort,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, March 26, 2018, https://www.nist.gov/blogs/taking-measure/big-inch-fueling-americas-wwii-war-effort.

[vi] Martin, “The Big Inch: Fueling America’s WWII War Effort.”                                                    


 

US Needs LNG to Fight a Two-Front Gas War. Gas is a critical geoeconomic tool to deter and confront Russian aggression.

Energy Security in the Atlantic and Pacific: Can LNG Meet the Gathering Storm

Gabriel Collins, J.D., Center for Energy Studies LNG Roundtable Remarks, 29 September 2022. Thank you to my colleague Steven Miles for hosting a superb event and inviting me to be a panelist!

Good, bad, and interesting things tend to come in groups of 3

Theme #1: Russia’s partial gas blockade of Europe reminds us that with all due apologies to the tech sector, molecules are still the foundational king of human economic and social activity.

Physical commodities are to the economy what a concrete slab foundation is to a house: only 1-3% of the cost but jeopardizes the entire structure if compromised. Similarly, unfolding events in Europe demonstrate that $250 billion per year worth of gas can imperil a $20 trillion continental economy. Markets adjust over time but absent dramatic geoeconomic intervention, may not do so quickly enough to prevent “General Gas” and “General Time” from splitting the current anti-Russian coalition. Russia is now doubling down on its bet.

Theme #2: Russia has “burned its gas boats on the Baltic beach”—and it is years away from having a gas ship capable of sailing to Asia at similar scale.

Imagine if Saudi Arabia reduced its oil exports to prime customers by 3 million bpd over a 12-month span, launched a bloody and unprovoked invasion of Qatar, reduced oil exports further, announced it would export 5 million fewer bpd over the next 3 years, and then to accentuate the point, blew up two of its oil pipelines feeding the Ras al-Tanura export facility. Sounds crazy, right? It is…but this is essentially exactly what Russia has done thus far with natural gas exports and its war on Ukraine.

Destroying 40-year-old customer relationships and consummating the act by sabotaging physical infrastructure is unprecedented in the global energy markets. Exporters have embargoed customers (OPEC in 1973) and countries have tried to destroy others’ export capacity (Iran/Iraq and Iraq vs Kuwait in 1991) but to my knowledge, no country has inflicted both wounds upon itself. More Russian gas coercion awaits—watch the supply corridor through Ukraine in coming days and weeks.

Theme #3: We’re in for a Long War.

Brace for at least two winters of energy tension, if not outright crisis. Stress could endure much longer if policymakers fail to realize that the words they put on paper and in speeches will influence markets’ ability to supply the molecules needed not just in Europe but Asia too. The world has now entered a new phase of “Blood, Iron, and Silicon” competition—and energy underpins all those national power dimensions. We’re in uncharted waters.

Related Publication: Miles, Steven R., Gabriel Collins, and Anna Mikulska. 2022. US Needs LNG to Fight a Two-Front Gas War. Policy report no. 08.18.22. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas. 

Gas Geoeconomics Essential to Win the “Long War” In Ukraine—And Asia

Full Presentation Can be Downloaded Here.

Gas geoeconomics is an essential prerequisite for victory in Ukraine, U.S. credibility in Asia, and should be one of Washington’s top national security priorities.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine credibly reflects reveals a desire to re-establish Moscow-centric imperium through force of arms, potentially along the approximate territorial parameters of the mid-19th Century Russian Empire in Europe.

Rolling back the Kremlin’s existing war of conquest and deterring future depredations will require a level of NATO defense-industrial mobilization not seen since the 1980s. Present sanctions efforts, even if deepened, cannot compensate for NATO’s undersized munitions stockpiles and insufficient ability to recapitalize forces and potentially, timely replace combat losses—three elements critical for deterrence.

Energy insecurity corrodes the economic and political foundations needed to sustain defense-industrial mobilization. Russia is thus intensifying its unprecedented efforts dating from early 2021 to use gas as an instrument to coerce and destabilize prime customers in Western Europe. Unless Europe adopts proactive, war footing gas security policies, “General Time” will be on Russia’s side.

Suggested Citation:

Gabriel Collins, Anna Mikulska, and Steven Miles, “Gas Geoeconomics Essential to Win the ‘Long War’ In Ukraine—And Asia,” Baker Institute Research Presentation, September 2022