What does “hold the line through 2035” mean?
This slide deck, posted on the Portal in February 2023, develops a strategic framework for the Asia-Pacific. It draws on the 12 November 2020 Baker Institute study by Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson. The deck’s title slide separately states that the slides reflect Collins’s views; preserve that distinction when citing the presentation or the joint paper.
Why does the analysis use a 2035 horizon?
The economic and demographic discussion treats 2035 as a strategic planning horizon and considers how structural pressures could change China’s ability to generate national power. These are analytical judgments about possible trajectories, rather than a guarantee that competition or danger ends in that year. Structural pressures, slides 14–16.
What is active about holding the line?
The framework emphasizes adaptation, imposing costs and managing risk. It asks how diplomatic, economic and defense choices can shape incentives while sustaining a rules-based regional order. The opening principles are the starting point for the later policy menu. Core principles, slide 3.
How do resources and institutions constrain strategy?
The recommendations connect strategic credibility to practical capabilities, infrastructure, cooperation with partners and the ability to sustain commitments. Read the specific platform targets and policy examples in their historical context, while using the broader framework to examine priorities and tradeoffs. Policy menu, slide 19.
Where does the domestic economy enter the argument?
The final sections bring public support, legislative activity and critical supply chains into the same picture. They show why a regional security strategy also depends on industrial and institutional resilience at home. Home-front discussion, slides 43–44.
The later Hold the Line article and corporate-risk presentation offer additional routes into this research.
A Strategy to Offset China’s Revisionist Actions and Sustain a Rules-Based Order in the Asia-Pacific
This slide deck has been evolving over the past couple of years and the ongoing set of actions by the PRC only re-emphasizes the importance of many of the policy items mentioned therein.
Full slide deck downloadable here
Based On: Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hold The Line through 2035: A Strategy to Offset China’s Revisionist Actions and Sustain a Rules-Based Order in the Asia-Pacific,” Houston, TX: Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 12 November 2020, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/1e07d836/ces-pub-asiapacific-111120.pdf
Original slides and transcript
The full Baker Institute paper is available at https://doi.org/10.25613/4fzk-1v17.
Full text of the slides (from the PDF)
Slide 1. Hold The Line Through 2035
A Strategy to Offset China’s Revisionist Actions and Sustain a Rules-Based Order in the Asia-Pacific
*These slides exclusively reflect the opinions and views of author Collins.* 1
Based On:
Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hold The Line through 2035: A Strategy to Offset China’s
Revisionist Actions and Sustain a Rules-Based Order in the Asia-Pacific,” Houston, TX: Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 12 November 2020, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/1e07d836/ces-pub-asiapacific-111120.pdf
Slide 3. Hold the Line Through 2035
• Impose Costs.
• Emphasize adaptive actions.
• Embrace risk.
• Balance liminal conflict with the real risk of near-peer high-intensity war.
• Dynamically adjust, avoid concessions to what is PRC bluffing/miscalculation of own long-term national power.
“The time to hold the line in multiple dimensions begins NOW.”
“The United States does not have the qualification to say that it wants to speak to China from a position of strength,”—Yang
Jiechi, Director of Central Foreign Affairs Commission Office, March 2021
Source: Wall Street Journal, March 2021
Slide 4. US National Interests Run Deep in Asia-Pacific
US Foreign Trade Turnover, By Region (Million USD) Pacific Rim as % of Total US Import and Export Trade
Source: US Census Bureau, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Pacific Rim Countries – Australia, Brunei, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea (South), Macau, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan. 4
Asia-Pacific Region is a Trillion Dollar-plus marketplace for the United States
Slide 5. U.S. as a Strategic Balancer Role Different in Asia-Pacific and Europe
Russia GDP vs. Europe, China GDP Vs. Other Asia-Pacific China’s “Economic Mass” Nearing Parity With Rest of Region
“Other Asia-Pacific” GDP vs. China’s:
“10 means 10X larger than Chinese GDP, 1 means parity.” DOES NOT include United
States.
Source: World Bank, Author’s Analysis
This dataset has significant implications for how the European and Pacific Deterrence Initiatives compete for funding.
Slide 6. High Stakes if Deterrence Fails
• The last 20 years have been about brushfire wars. Great power conflict could involve full societal mobilization, with dramatic consequences worldwide.
• Total war between industrialized titans is a terrible enterprise.
Things that are nearly unimaginable under “normal” circumstances can rapidly become standard and acceptable.
• Cyber, maritime, air, space domains would all be bitterly contested.
Everything from factories, to critical home front infrastructure, to pointy end of military spear will be shot at and/or hacked by the adversary.
• Long war the most likely scenario
• U.S. victory far from assured—and could well prove Pyrrhic.
• Massive destruction of global industrial and technological base.
Combined, China and the U.S. are in practical terms, irreplaceable across multiple physical, intellectual, and technological value chains.
• Huge setback for progress in multiple key domains
• No country/supernational bloc logically positioned to meaningfully supplant the role of temporarily dis-empowered Chi-Merica colossus
• Likely sets stage for massive follow-on disorder as mid-sized powers compete to fill the temporary vacuum. https://www.history.navy.mil
Slide 7. 2021-to-2023 Is A Critical Action Period
• Four core criteria: (1) have maximum strategic impact, (2) primarily rely upon existing resources, (3) be implementable at a low bandwidth burden, & (4) sustain bi-partisan political support.
• Budget priorities starting to reflect these realities, with INDOPACOM’s Pacific
Deterrence Initiative allocated $2.2 billion in FY2021 and an estimated
$4.6 billion in FY2022. 7
Pacific Deterrence Initiative Funding Ask Increased Significantly Over Past Year
Source: Breaking Defense, US DoD, The Drive
Slide 8. “Stand Our Ground” Can Be Implemented Now Using Existing
Resources
The U.S. cannot afford to wait for new military hardware to enter service before challenging the PRC more robustly. Waiting even 12 additional months before stiffening our resolve risks allowing the PRC to further distort the region’s strategic gravity in ways that would potentially permanently jeopardize core U.S. economic & security interests.
The most important asset—willingness to accept greater friction and higher risk as we leverage our formidable existing capabilities—sits in our hands.
Embracing it would allow us to immediately begin recalibrating the Indo-Pacific strategic environment.
Sample Action Items
Bolster US diplomatic engagement in key Indo-Pacific areas
Commence Negotiations on Grand Trade Agreement 2.0
Robustly defend core US technologies and begin comprehensively revitalizing industrial base
More robustly challenge PRC Maritime Militia operations
Increase procurement volumes for existing standoff land attack and anti-ship munitions such as JASSM-ER, Maritime Strike Tomahawk, and SM-6
Reposition platforms and strategic focus from CENTCOM to INDOPACOM
Further expand PDI funding
Accelerate basing infrastructure improvements in Australia
Accelerate basing infrastructure improvements on Wake, Tinian/Saipan, Aleutians
Accelerate pre-positioning of equipment within First Island Chain
Increase deployment of air defense assets and anti-ship fires within First Island Chain
Offer Japanese, South Korean, and ASEAN firms US assistance in the event of geoeconomic retaliation by PRC
Slide 9. China’s Rise
Slide 10. China Has Translated Economic Growth Into Military Power
Primary Energy Use of China and Other Key Economic Actors
Source: BP Statistical Yearbook of World Energy 2020, Author’s Analysis
PLAN Combat Vessels in Service
Including the Coast Guard and Maritime Militia More Than Doubles Ship Numbers, Albeit At Lower Capability Level
Source: DoD China Military Power Reports, Author’s Analysis
Slide 11. World-Class Platforms Across Maritime Dimensions
Sources: CSIS (YJ-18), Asia-Pacific Defence Journal (Type 055), China Plus (CG3901 cutter)
Type 055 “Renhai” Cruiser:
Seven launched to date, 2 already in service
2X the displacement of USCG’s Legend-class high-endurance cutters
250nm-range ASCM, supersonic terminal velocity
Slide 12. China Faces Rising Risk of Demographic and Economic
Stasis…With Major Impacts on Ability to Generate National
Power
Slide 13. What If the United States of 1920 Had
The Problems of 2020?
Source: U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, NBS China, Author’s Analysis
Rail Freight Traffic
Slide 14. China Slowdown Factors: Demographics & Debt
Household Debt Levels, % of GDP and Absolute LevelProportion of Population Older Than 65 Years
Source: World Bank Source: Bank for International Settlements, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Slide 15. China Real Economy Slowdown
Diesel Fuel Demand, ‘000 Bpd Rail Freight Movement, Billion Tonne-Kilometers
Source: JODI Source: NBS China
Slide 16. China’s Likely Overall Trajectory: “S-Curved” Slowdown
Potential future economic growth path for China if headwinds— particularly demographic ones— persist & intensify. (Based on actual reported Chinese and Japanese GDP in 2018, constant U.S. Dollars)
Size of Economy
Japan’s example shows how a worldclass industrial power can be trapped by structural economic and demographic stagnation…
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Authors’ analysis
• 2035 = key time horizon for China’s grand strategy goals & implementation.
• Great power development history + China’s challenges suggest “Peak
PRC” growth is already past.
Slide 17. Discussing the Spectrum of Actions Needed vis-à-vis China
D iplomatic
Information
M ilitary
E conomic
17Source: US Mint
Slide 18. Need Both Teeth and Armor in Ample Measure
Expensive, active Cheaper, passive
Source: Lockheed Martin Source: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Source: Dallas City News
Slide 19. Key Action Items for Accelerated Implementation
Bolster U.S. Strategic Credibility
• “Hands on” maritime security operations and cooperation with partner countries
• Reduce platform wear incurred in CENTCOM AOR
• Additional hardening and dispersion efforts for US bases in INDOPACOM AOR
• Dramatically expand munitions procurement
• Congressional appropriation of funding to accelerate shipbuilding, with objective of 355+ ship Navy by 2030.
• Major expansion of forward ship repair capabilities
Diplomatic/Economic
• Big new free trade deal
• Vaccine diplomacy
• Deploy Seabees and U.S. construction capabilities to enhance island nations and coastal areas with resilience challenges
• Publish annual “PRC Malign Activities Report”
• Publicize corrupt activities, foreign assets, business dealings of key PRC officials and close associates who are plausibly acting as their proxies.
• Provide advice to countries at risk of being entrapped by Belt and Road project loans
• De-link key supply chains from China to the maximum extent possible 19
Slide 20. Embrace Less-Orthodox Ideas
• F-15EX in maritime strike role
• Or as a hypersonic launch platform
• “The reason we went with ARRW was not that HCSW was bad, but ARRW is smaller; we can carry twice as many on the B-52, and it’s possible it could be on the F-15 … It’s in the class to be able to fit on the centerline” station.”—Dr. Will Roper, Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 28 February 2020
• Produce additional P-8As or re-fit certain aircraft in fleet as hypersonic/standoff weapons carriers?
• Re-purposed commercial vessels as rapidly scalable, expendable, and lower cost “maritime trucks” for OTH strike systems such as RIM-174, MST
• Maintain certain proportion of force that can fight “dumb and analog” in event adversary succeeds in disrupting networked comms.
• Leverage commercial ISR redundancy—think Planet Labs +
Ursa Space + ship tracking services + many other COTS. Not perfect, but limited SA much better than trying to operate blind. Adversary probably can’t shut down all COTS ISR options. Proprietary hypersonic drones can help close gaps and could even go Cold War redux to reduce cyber/satellite exposure—think mid-air film recovery.
• F-22 exports to Japan? Other cost-sharing?
• Operations to illustrate PRC’s tenuous hold on militarized reclaimed islands and sub-tidal features in SCS Source: Christopher McGreevey (original photo), https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/21755/f-15sabristles-with-a-dozen-aim-120s-missiles-during-star-wars-canyon-run
Source: SXSW 2011 Lego Pile, flickr.com
Slide 21. Semi-Kinetic Maritime Security Options
Slide 22. “Semi-Kinetic Operations” to Support Allies and Partners in Maritime Asia
Slide 23. Strategic Prioritization
Slide 24. “Manage the Mileage” Key Platforms Are Incurring in Other AORs
• In April 2019, the commanding general in charge of U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command noted that U.S. commitments in the Middle East
“overextended” the B-1B Lancer bomber force and triggered premature maintenance.
• Such force readiness issues directly affect the U.S. posture and credibility in the Asia-Pacific, particularly when as in this case, they implicate hardware systems that would play a core role in potential East Asian contingencies. 24
US + Coalition Munitions Expended in CENTCOM AOR
Source: afcent.af.mil Airpower Summaries
US + Coalition Aerial Refuellings in CENTCOM AOR
Slide 25. Selected Partner Countries: Is Defense a Priority?
Key Asian Partners vs. the Regional “Pacing Threat” Key European Partners vs. the Regional “Pacing Threat”
Source: SIPRI Milex dataset, Author’s Analysis
This dataset also has significant implications for how the European and Pacific Deterrence Initiatives should compete for funding.
Slide 26. Basing
Slide 27. Focusing Principles: Chinese Power Projection Capabilities
Source: dailymail.co.uk Source: wikimedia
Source: China Military Power Report
Source: The Drive
Source: U.S. DoD
Slide 28. Place U.S. Territory?
Max Currently
Operational
Runway
Length (ft)
Potential
Runway
Length (ft)
Beijing Shanghai Sanya
Diego Garcia N 12,000 – 10.8 9.4 6.2
Guam (Andersen AFB) Y 11,200 – 5.0 3.9 4.8
RAAF Darwin N 11,000 – 7.6 6.1 5.0
Shemya (Alaska) Y 10,000 – 6.4 6.0 8.6
Wake Island Y 9,850 – 6.8 5.9 7.4
RAAF Tindal N 9,000 – 8.0 6.4 5.4
Saipan Y 8,700 – 5.0 4.0 4.8
Tinian Y 8,600 – 5.0 4.0 4.8
Midway Y 7,800 – 7.8 7.2 9.0
Palau N 7,200 – 5.2 3.7 3.7
Rota Y 7,000 – 5.0 4.0 4.8
Attu (Alaska, Casco Cove) Y – 6,700 6.4 6.0 8.6
Amchitka (Alaska) Y – 10,000 7.0 6.4 9.0
Hours’ Flight Time @ 500 MPH
China
RAAF northern bases
Palau
Guam/Saipan/Tinian/Rota
Wake
Midway
Outer Aleutians
Slide 29. Dispersal +
Unpredictability=Survival
2017: Hurlburt Field
2016: Estonia2014: Tinian
2018: Wake Island
2018: Campbell/Dugway https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/dong-feng26-df-26/ The “Old” Threat to Bases
The “New” Threat to Bases
2020: Texas-to-Guam
2021: Louisiana-to-Guam
2021: Texas-to-Norway
Note that this is not showing multiple recent
CONUS-to-CENTCOM deployments
Slide 30. Dispersed Operations: Places and Bases
Expeditionary Sea Bases: 2 commissioned, 1 delivered, 1 under construction, 1 under contract
Total contract value for ESB-6 and ESB-7 could max out at $1.63 billion
Access to third-country territory within the Island Chains not assured, especially if regional players are hedging their bets early in a crisis or conflict
Slide 31. Next Steps For Dispersed
Operations
• Publish images of B-1B/B-52 flights using Eareckson Air
Station on Shemya in the Aleutians. Test hot pit refuelling.
• Construct hardened munitions igloos and fuel storage on Johnston Atoll, Kwajalein, Shemya, and potentially also Attu.
• Construct underground fuel storage on Shemya sufficient to sustain 30 days of high-intensity air operations.
• Test landing/refuelling/re-arming/takeoff of tactical air assets from all main US services using roadways and civilian airports in at least 5 distinct INDOPACOM locations
Source: Globalsecurity.org
Source: Shreveport Times
Source: af.mil
Slide 32. Munitions
Slide 33. Let The Missiles Do The Work
• “To defeat lower technology platforms, the Department is procuring additional 4th generation F/A-18E/F and the F-15EX aircraft, which nominally have lower operating costs when compared to 5th generation combat jets such as the F-22 and the F-35.”—FY2021 DoD Budget Request, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, Page 6 [emphasis added]
Or, creative thinking + better munitions + updated legacy platforms = net increase in practical combat power
Quickstrike-ER
Source: CSIS (SM-6), USAF/Naval News(Quickstrike-ER), Raytheon (SM-6)
Standard SM-6
“We’re modifying the SM-6, so that in addition to missile defense, it can also target enemy ships at sea at very long ranges. This is a new anti-ship mode. It makes the SM-6 basically a twofer. Can shoot down airborne threats. And now you can attack and destroy a ship at long range with the very same missile.”—SECDEF Ash Carter, February
Slide 34. Potential Targets and Munitions Needs
• Bases/Key Military Facilities
• A2/AD suppression (Long range
SAMs, ballistic missiles, Late Gen
Strike Aircraft)
• Surface combatants (heavies and Type 056/Maritime Militia
Vessels)
• Commerce interdiction
• Industrial and Logistical
Infrastructure
Key Military Facilities (10s)
A2/AD Kill Chain (100s)
Tier-1 Industrial and Logistical Infrastructure (1,000s)
Lower-Tier Industrial and Civil Infrastructure (10,000s)
Source: https://media.istockphoto.com
Slide 35. Massive Munitions Needs for Credible Deterrence
• China is about 22 times physically larger than Iraq and has exponentially more military and strategic industrial and infrastructure points that might be targeted under various scenarios.
9,596,960 sq km
438,317 sq km
U.S. Aerial Munitions Expenditure During Operation Iraqi Freedom Through 30 April 2003
Source: US CENTAF
Combat in maritime East Asia would amplify demands, esp. for AAMs, ASCMs & torpedoes.35
Slide 36. Guided Munitions Unguided Munitions Gun Rounds
Long-Range Standoff (200+ Miles) Units Expended M117 1,625 20MM 16,901
BGM-109 TLAM 802 MK-82 5,504 30MM 311,597
AGM-86 C/D CALCM 153 MK-83 1,692
MK-84 6
Medium-Range Standoff (50-200 miles) Units Expended CBU-87 118
AGM-154 JSOW 253 CBU-99 182
AGM-84 SLAM-ER 3 9,127
SEAD Units Expended
AGM-88 408
Short-Range Standoff (less than 50 miles) Units Expended
AGM-65 918
AGM-114 562
AGM-130 4
EGBU-27 98
GBU-10 236
GBU-12 7,114
GBU-16 1,233
GBU-24 23
GBU-27 11
GBU-28 1
GBU-31 5,086
GBU-32 768
GBU-35 675
GBU-37 13
Avoiding Winchester: Supporting Data
Slide 37. Shipbuilding/Acquisition
Slide 38. US Fleet Has Shrunk—Mission Demand Has Not
Major Combatants and Auxiliaries in U.S. Fleet
Source: U.S. Navy, Author’s Analysis USS John McCain, 2017. Source: CBS News
Slide 39. How Can USN Get to a 355+ Ship Fleet?
Source: U.S DoD, Author’s Analysis
U.S. DoD Acquisition Budgets Are Not Pricing a Massive Fleet Build
Billion Current USD
Source: U.S Navy
Source: USNI Source: Jane’s
Slide 40. Repair and Regeneration
Slide 41. Defense Industrial Base: Repair Apra Harbor, Guam (1945): USS ABSD-3 Large
Auxiliary Floating Dry Dock repairing USS
Pennsylvania after kamikaze attack.
Source: http://www.navsource.org/archives/09/67/6703.htm
• “The most dramatic demonstration of the importance of the mobile drydocks was given during the long drawn-out naval support of the invasion of Okinawa, when the fleet was subjected for weeks to continual and desperate
“Kamikaze” attacks by Japanese suicide-bombers.”
• “The fleet suffered great damage, but the ready availability of the mobile drydocks at nearby advance bases, and the yeoman service rendered by their own crews and the ship repair components at these bases, save many ships and minimized the time ships were out of action for repairs, to such an extent that these docks may well have represented the margin between success and failure.”–Building the Navy’s Bases in World War II, Volume I (Part II), Naval History and Heritage Command
Slide 42. The Home Front
Slide 43. China Challenge Capturing Attention of American Public and Capitol Hill
Source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey
U.S. Public’s Increasingly Negative Views of China… …Are Translating Into Increased legislative Activity
Legislative actions, by Congressional Session
Source: Congress.gov, Author’s Analysis
Slide 44. Priority Strategic Action Items That Are “Beyond PDI”
• Supply chain de-linking
• Category 1: Anything that goes in American consumers’ bodies, esp. critical medications (antibiotics, antihypertensives, vaccines and components, etc.)
• Category 2: Medical equipment and PPE
• Category 3: Critical mineral inputs, including, but not limited to rare earths
• Category 4: Key electronics components
• Federal procurement standards would create enormous leverage.
Slide 45. Thank you! gbc3@rice.edu https://www.bakerinstitute.org/experts/gabe-collins/





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