Key takeaways
- Chinese energy policymakers hold a quasi-autarchic mindset: the more energy China sources within its own borders, the better off they believe it will be.
- China’s national energy system is now about 1.6 times the size of that of the United States, the world’s second-largest energy consumer.
- Xi Jinping told oilfield workers in October 2021 that China must keep its “energy rice bowl” in its own hands, framing energy as worst-case preparation.
- Energy offers strategists real-time evidence of China’s intentions because energy activities are hard to hide and leave signatures that satellites can track.
- The International Energy Agency’s market-based definition of energy security contrasts with Beijing’s preference for avoiding interdependence and imports.
Full Presentation: Gabriel Collins, “China Mobilizes Its Energy Sector For Great Power Competition and Global Disorder,” https://collinsresearchportal.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Collins_China-Mobilizes-Its-Energy-Sector-For-Great-Power-Competition-and-Global-Disorder_October-2025.pdf
Energy involves both the physical world of heat, flame, splitting atoms, and spinning turbines as well as the more ethereal—but incredibly powerful—world of globalized markets. It also presents unique analytical opportunities. Strategists studying war and long-term strategic competition rarely receive real-time feedback from the world around them (apart from wars like those underway in Ukraine or Israel). Episodic events force a heavy reliance on backcasting and parsing the past for clues about the present. Hence, the use of the time-worn adage that “generals always fight the last war.”
Energy is very different because energy “war” is being fought constantly in real time as companies, consumers, and countries iteratively prepare for the “next” campaign. Energy activities are also harder to hide than military ones due to their sheer scale and distinct signatures.
Even when Beijing seeks to conceal activities, they often reveal themselves through flows of physical goods, capital investments, and various emissions such as heat, methane, carbon dioxide, oil tank roofs, coal piles, dams, nuclear reactors, wind turbine and solar farms, and land-use changes that can be tracked by satellite. Words matter but actions speak far louder.
Energy security is national security. Energy drives economic competitiveness (and by extension, national power) and, at the most basic level, underpins modern civilization. We need it to cool off and stay warm, access clean water, remove and treat sewage, or bring essential foods and other items from producers to consumers. This is especially true for China, where basic, energy-intensive industries remain systemically important economic engines and the national energy system is now about 1.6 times the size of that of the United States, the planet’s second-largest consumer (see Figure 2).
Scholarly writings and lived action also suggest that Chinese policymakers think differently about energy and its role in a nation’s competitive position and well-being than do many of their counterparts in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) world. The International Energy Agency—a proxy for liberal, global market-based approaches—defines energy security as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.”4
Member countries (including the United States) have worked to create a coordinated system for managing strategic oil reserves, share information through fantastic data resources like the Energy Information Administration (EIA), and generally leverage transparency and market forces to achieve their objectives.
PRC energy policymakers tend to take a different approach. They harbor a quasi-autarchic mindset rooted in decades of policy premised on fearing and avoiding interdependence and imports. Stripping complex equations and regression analysis from contemporary PRC scholarship on energy security frequently leaves behind a stark conclusion: the more energy a country can source from within its own borders, the better off it will be.5
General Secretary Xi Jinping’s admonition to delegates of the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 that China must “be prepared for the worst-case scenarios, and be ready to withstand high winds, choppy waters and even dangerous storms” exemplifies this worldview.6 Xi has made clear that energy is part of this stormbreaker strategy, telling workers at China’s second-largest oilfield in October 2021 that the country must “ensure that its ‘energy rice bowl’ remains in its own hands.”7
Full article here: https://strategicspace.nbr.org/energy-as-a-strategic-space-for-china-words-and-actions-point-to-a-competitive-future/
Full presentation here:
Frequently asked questions
How does China define energy security?
Chinese policymakers tend to equate energy security with self-sufficiency. Gabriel Collins argues that PRC scholarship, stripped of its regression analysis, often concludes that the more energy a country sources within its own borders, the better off it will be. That view reflects a quasi-autarchic mindset rooted in decades of fearing interdependence and imports.
How big is China’s energy system compared to the United States?
China’s national energy system is now about 1.6 times the size of that of the United States, which is the world’s second-largest energy consumer. Collins notes that this scale matters because basic, energy-intensive industries remain systemically important engines of China’s economy, which makes energy central to its national power.
Why is energy useful for tracking China’s strategic intentions?
Energy gives analysts real-time evidence that military competition rarely provides. Collins argues that energy activities are hard to hide because of their scale and distinct signatures, so even concealed Chinese efforts show up in flows of goods, capital investment, emissions, oil tank roofs, coal piles, dams, reactors, and land-use changes visible by satellite.
What has Xi Jinping said about energy security?
Xi Jinping has framed energy as part of preparing for worst-case scenarios. At the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 he urged readiness for “high winds, choppy waters and even dangerous storms,” and in October 2021 he told workers at China’s second-largest oilfield to keep the “energy rice bowl” in China’s own hands.
How does China’s energy security approach differ from the IEA’s?
China prioritizes domestic supply, while the IEA emphasizes market access. The International Energy Agency defines energy security as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price,” and its members, including the United States, rely on coordinated strategic oil reserves, shared data, transparency, and market forces. PRC policymakers instead favor self-reliance.
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