Key takeaways
- A maritime oil blockade against China is tactically tempting but strategically flawed, according to Gabriel Collins’s 2018 Naval War College Review article.
- Even a militarily successful blockader of China’s oil imports could find its political, economic, and diplomatic position untenable well before the blockade exerts its full effects.
- The political, economic, and financial demands of sustaining an oil blockade against China weigh as heavily as the naval mission itself.
- Gabriel Collins argues that analyzing blockades is an essential part of the broader discussion of potential competitive strategies toward the People’s Republic of China.
Summary
In this Spring 2018 Naval War College Review article, Gabriel Collins argues that a maritime oil blockade against China would be tactically tempting but strategically flawed. The U.S. military could almost certainly execute a distant blockade, but the political, economic and financial costs of sustaining it, together with pressure from neutral countries and allies, would likely make the blockader’s position untenable before the blockade exerted its full effect, especially as China retaliated by nonmilitary means. Building on his 2008 study with William S. Murray, “No Oil for the Lamps of China?”, Collins warns that treating an energy embargo as a substitute for war could undermine U.S. credibility with allies, let leaders defer needed weapons procurement, and mislead the public into believing a conflict with China could be won cheaply. Great-power wars, he notes, are usually won on the political and economic fronts.
Read the article at the Naval War College Review: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss2/6
The political, economic, and financial aspects of sustaining an oil blockade against China mean that even a militarily successful blockader could find its political, economic, and diplomatic position untenable well before a blockade could exert its full effects.
Analyzing blockades is an essential part of the broader discussion on potential competitive strategies to use vis-a-vis the PRC.
Recommended Citation
Collins, Gabriel (2018) “A Maritime Oil Blockade Against China—Tactically Tempting but Strategically Flawed,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 71 : No. 2 , Article 6. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss2/6/
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss2/6
Frequently asked questions
Would an oil blockade against China work?
An oil blockade against China might work tactically but is strategically flawed, according to Gabriel Collins. Even if the blockader succeeds militarily, the political, economic, and financial burdens of sustaining the effort could make its position untenable well before the blockade exerts its full effects on China.
Why is a maritime oil blockade of China considered strategically flawed?
A maritime oil blockade of China is considered strategically flawed because of the cost of keeping it going. Collins argues that political, economic, and financial strains could erode the blockader’s diplomatic position before the blockade has time to produce its intended effects, even if naval forces perform well.
Where was Gabriel Collins’s analysis of a China oil blockade published?
Gabriel Collins published the analysis in the Naval War College Review in 2018, Volume 71, Number 2, as Article 6. The full paper, titled “A Maritime Oil Blockade Against China—Tactically Tempting but Strategically Flawed,” is available through the U.S. Naval War College digital commons.
Why study blockades as part of US strategy toward China?
Blockades deserve study because they are part of the broader discussion of competitive strategies toward the People’s Republic of China. Collins’s analysis shows why an option that looks tempting at the tactical level needs to be tested against its political, economic, financial, and diplomatic costs.
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