Key takeaways
- Spreading, increasingly affordable conventional deep strike weapons may be shrinking the protective bubble that nuclear deterrence gives nuclear-armed states, Gabriel Collins argues.
- Iran’s two missile and drone attacks on Israel, India-Pakistan strikes, and Ukraine’s bomber raid on Russia have so far produced no nuclear response.
- Ukraine’s drone operation, launched from truck trailers, potentially damaged or destroyed 1/3 of Russia’s strategic bombers, one leg of its nuclear triad.
- Collins cautions that each case is highly fact-dependent and that drawing sweeping conclusions immediately would probably be dangerous.
- U.S. planners should examine both latitude for conventional strikes on China in a war and how to defend bases like Guam and Diego Garcia.
Nuclear proliferation is (and should be) a matter of deep policy focus. But events of the past 12-to-15 months raise an interesting new question–what if the proliferation of increasingly capable and affordable conventional deep strike capabilities is eroding the protective bubble that nuclear deterrence exerts?
I write this because we have now seen (1) Iran twice rain conventional ballistic missiles and drones on Israel (a nuclear power) without precipitating a nuclear response, (2) India and Pakistan (both nuclear powers) launch fairly deep conventional strikes on each other, and (3) Ukraine just potentially damaged/destroyed 1/3 of Russia’s strategic bombers with an incredibly creative operation using drones imported in truck trailers. So far at least, none of these dramatic events–which would have been hard to conceive of just 5 years ago–have precipitated a nuclear response.
To be sure, each situation is incredibly fact-dependent and it would probably be dangerous to immediately draw sweeping conclusions. Nonetheless, each time this dynamic plays out in various parts of the world where there is kinetic conflict involving a nuclear-armed state, the fundamental question will arise.
And each time a nuclear-armed state’s opponent strikes it with long range conventional weapons and there is NOT a nuclear response, the envelope of deterrence shrinks. Deterrence is much more psychological than physical, a reality Ukraine has massively exploited in its war for survival. It has struck the bomber base at Engels multiple times in the past few years, attacked strategic warning radars, and now, in one fell swoop crippled one leg of Russia’s nuclear triad.
This is big stuff. I don’t have ready answers and this post is probably going to evolve significantly as the debate deepens and I get feedback. One issue that comes to front of mind from an American perspective is “what do Ukraine’s actions potentially teach us about US latitude for conventional strikes on China if a war ever broke out?”
It’s an uncomfortable and unhappy subject, but an incredibly relevant one because so much of the public debate in recent years has been premised on the idea that conventional strikes on the PRC in the course of a conflict over Taiwan (for instance) would trigger World War III and a nuclear Armageddon. But what if they perhaps would not? Again, there are not clear answers, but thinking this stuff through will be incredibly important for US and allied planners if we are to more effectively deter conflict in the Indo-Pacific or, if the unthinkable happens, best position the forces of freedom to prevail.
Russia’s handling of Ukraine’s recent strikes should also inform NATO planning. There is also a flip side to the questions these strikes raise–if Ukraine is able to disable a material portion of Russia’s nuclear-capable bomber force and not suffer nuclear retaliation, what does that mean for the US?
The things that have happened to Russia could potentially be visited upon us as well as long-range conventional strike technology and tactics (especially in the drone realm) continue to proliferate. What would we do if an adversary or one of their proxies tried an attack like this against Diego Garcia, Guam, or one of the Stateside bomber bases?
If we are not already intensively engaged with this question and thinking through responses, we should start doing so. Reality will not wait for us on any of these fronts. Iran, India, Pakistan, and most of all, Ukraine have each taken bold actions that are reshaping the strategic environment and the ways that we’ll have to potentially rethink deterrence if we want to stave off conflict.
Suggested Citation: Gabriel Collins, “Is Nuclear Deterrence Eroding in the Face of Proliferating Conventional Deep Strike Capabilities?” Collins Research Portal, 1 June 2025.
Frequently asked questions
Is nuclear deterrence weakening because of conventional long-range strikes?
Possibly. Gabriel Collins argues that each time a nuclear-armed state is hit by long-range conventional weapons without responding with nuclear arms, the envelope of deterrence shrinks. He notes deterrence is more psychological than physical, though he stresses each case is fact-dependent and sweeping conclusions would be premature.
Which recent attacks on nuclear-armed states did not trigger a nuclear response?
Collins cites three cases from the past 12 to 15 months. Iran twice launched conventional ballistic missiles and drones at Israel, India and Pakistan launched fairly deep conventional strikes on each other, and Ukraine used drones to hit Russia’s strategic bombers. None of these events has so far led to a nuclear response.
What did Ukraine’s drone attack on Russian strategic bombers achieve?
Ukraine potentially damaged or destroyed 1/3 of Russia’s strategic bombers using drones brought in by truck trailers. Collins says the operation crippled one leg of Russia’s nuclear triad. Ukraine had earlier struck the Engels bomber base several times and attacked Russian strategic warning radars, all without nuclear retaliation.
Would U.S. conventional strikes on China in a Taiwan war lead to nuclear war?
Not necessarily, Collins suggests, though he offers no firm answer. Much public debate assumes conventional strikes on the PRC in a Taiwan conflict would trigger World War III. Ukraine’s experience raises the possibility that they might not, which he says U.S. and allied planners need to think through carefully.
Could U.S. bomber bases face a Ukraine-style drone attack?
Collins warns they could as long-range conventional strike technology and tactics, especially drones, continue to spread. He asks how the United States would respond if an adversary or proxy attacked Diego Garcia, Guam, or a stateside bomber base, and urges planners to start working through responses now.
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