

# Competition First? Anchoring U.S. Climate & Energy Strategy Amidst Geostrategic Competition With China



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
*\*Note: These are working research findings and are subject to change. In the event of material developments, the author will post an updated version.\**

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
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# China Drives Global Emissions Growth

## Global CO2 Emissions Breakout, Million Tonnes/Year



## Trading Places: U.S. and China Share of Global CO2 Emissions



Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, Author's Analysis

**China and the U.S. now the biggest emitters, combined accounting for almost 45% of global CO2 emissions in 2020**

# Climate and Energy Actions Exist in a Broad Global Context

Sitting and waiting on the evolution of an increasingly tense relationship not an option, lest we flirt with potential points of no return.

## Competition With China Can Save the Planet

Pressure, Not Partnership, Will Spur Progress on Climate Change

*Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel Collins*

Late last year, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged that his country would reach “carbon neutrality” by 2060, meaning that by that time, it would remove every year from the atmosphere as much carbon dioxide as it emitted. China is currently the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, responsible for nearly 30 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions. Targeting net-zero emissions by 2060 is an ambitious goal, meant to signal Beijing’s commitment both to turning its enormous economy away from fossil fuels and to backing broader international efforts to combat climate change.

But this rhetorical posturing masks a very different reality: China remains addicted to coal, the dirtiest fossil fuel. It burns over four billion metric tons per year and accounts for half of the world’s total consumption. Roughly 65 percent of China’s electricity supply comes from coal, a proportion far greater than that of the United States (24 percent) or Europe (18 percent). Finnish and U.S. researchers revealed in February that China dramatically expanded its use of coal-fired power plants in 2020. China’s net coal-fired power generation capacity grew by about 30 gigawatts over the course of the year, as opposed to a net decline of 17 gigawatts elsewhere in the world. China also has nearly 200 gigawatts’ worth of coal power projects under con-

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**Multi-decade, multi-dimensional competition is already well underway**

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## CHINA'S CLIMATE COOPERATION SMOKESCREEN

*A Roadmap for Seeing Through the Trap and Countering with Competition*

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September 2021

# PRC Senior Leaders Are Securitizing Climate Issues

## Blunt Form Translations

“Climate diplomacy is inextricably linked with broader PRC diplomacy and protection of revisionist gains”


“We’re concretely naming some of our ‘core interests.’ We have some others too, like the South and East China Seas.”

“Climate discussions might begin IF Washington makes a big down payment by accepting our revisionist actions.”


- ❖ “...I'd like to stress that China-U.S. cooperation in specific areas, unlike flowers that can bloom in a greenhouse despite winter chill, is closely linked with bilateral relations as a whole. China has emphasized time and again that no one should imagine they could ask China to understand and support them in bilateral and global affairs when they blatantly interfere in China's domestic affairs and undermine China's interests.”—PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zhao Lijian, 28 January 2021
- ❖ “The United States should not repeatedly challenge China's rights and interests on issues related to Taiwan, Xinjiang and Hong Kong, and at the same time expect China to cooperate with it on issues of its own concern.”—PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi, 23 April 2021
- ❖ “China-U.S. cooperation on climate change cannot be divorced from the overall situation of China-U.S. relations. The United States should work with China to meet each other halfway and take positive actions to bring China-U.S. relations back on track.”—PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi, 1 September 2021

# U.S. Responding to PRC Revanchism, Cooperation Will Be Increasingly Difficult

## Defense Spending From 1990-2020, Billion Current USD



## China-Related Legislative Activity, 1973-Present



Source: SIPRI, Congress.gov, Author's Analysis


**Climate Competition and Energy  
Evolution Starts at Home, Carbon  
Taxation Potentially Plays  
Foundational Role**

# What Does “Carbon Tax” Potentially Mean Here?

## Carbon Tax

- ▶ Tax fuels based on carbon content or CO2 emissions upon combustion (0.27 tonnes of carbon per tonne of CO2, so every \$1 of CO2 taxation equivalent to \$3.70 of actual carbon content taxation).
- ▶ Practical Impacts: Every \$10/tonne increase in CO2 fee would:
  - ▶ raise gasoline prices by about 8.5¢/gallon;
  - ▶ increase avg. residential power bills by about 11¢/day, and
  - ▶ increase price of hamburger with a quarter-pound patty by about 4¢
- ▶ Practical Impacts: Social Security and SNAP payments already pegged to CPI, and food prices, respectively, which builds in protection from carbon fee-driven cost increases
- ▶ Practical Impacts: Could also set aside a certain portion of fee income to spin back to lower quartile households as a “carbon dividend.” (partial implementation of Baker-Schultz 2017 proposal)

## Multiple Potential Taxation Points





# “Carbon Fee” And Border Adjustments

## Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

- ▶ Goods importers pay fee based on difference between carbon taxation level in their place of production and United States
- ▶ In short, if U.S. assesses a \$60/tonne fee on domestic CO2 emissions and China charges \$10/tonne, goods imported from China would pay for “embedded” CO2 content at the rate of \$50/tonne [U.S. rate – China rate]
- ▶ Would include energy embedded in basic materials, including basic materials incorporated into manufactured products and then exported (for instance, an aluminum engine block or EV battery cathodes)
- ▶ Emissions can be based on national energy profiles (default) or possibly provincial/state-level, if supported by independently verifiable audit
- ▶ EU is already moving to implement a CBAM. Reporting and tracking will begin in 2023, with actual financial payments commencing in 2026. Revenues will be paid into the EU budget.
- ▶ Goods initially covered: iron and steel, cement, fertilizer, aluminum and electricity generation.
- ▶ Note the precedent set by recent Global Minimum Corporate Tax deal

Domestic Carbon Tax + CBAM = “complimentary goods.”



Source: Colgate

### Key Policy Issues To Consider:


- Offsets/credits, for instance based on nature-based or mechanical CO2 capture and sequestration
- What is ultimate carbon price needed to move from being viewed as “cost of doing business” to a true lever for change?
- Will PRC weaponize key supply chains such as rare earths or antibiotics to get U.S. to back down on CBAM applied to PRC-origin goods?

**Carbon Taxes Could Cement US  
Structural Energy Advantages and  
Create New Strategic Leverage**


# Talk vs. Action: Tale of Two Energy Transitions

Electricity Production, 1985-2020 (TWh, by Fuel)

## People's Republic of China




## United States



# U.S. Electricity Supply About 1/3 Less Carbon-Intensive Than China's

Thousand Tonnes of Carbon Dioxide Per Terawatt-Hour Generated



Coal: 1,000 KT CO<sub>2</sub> /TWh


Natural Gas: 413 KT CO<sub>2</sub> /TWh\*

Solar: 44 KT CO<sub>2</sub> /TWh  
 Hydro: 24 KT CO<sub>2</sub> /TWh\*  
 Wind: 11 KT CO<sub>2</sub> /TWh  
 Nuclear: 9 KT CO<sub>2</sub> /TWh


*\*Higher total GHG profile due to methane emissions*

# U.S. Carbon Advantage Endures on Broader Energy Front

China, Primary Energy Consumption, 1965-2020 (EJ, by Fuel)




U.S., Primary Energy Consumption, 1865-2020 (EJ, by Fuel)




Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, Author's Analysis

# China's Coal-Centricity + Export Orientation Creates Substantial Relative Exposure to Carbon Border Adjustment Taxes

## Net Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Million Tonnes






## CO2 Emissions Per Million BTU of Primary Energy Used



Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, environmentalfootprints.org, Exiobase, Author's Analysis

# China Has Moved Up the Export Value Chain...



Blue sector is the least energy-intensive relative to goods' value. Brownish shades, green, etc. trend much higher

# Carbon Border Adjustment: Quantifying Potential Impacts

## Basic Materials

Commodity	Total CBAM/Tonne	Approximate Mkt Price (11 October 2021)	CBAM % of Total Underlying Mkt Value
Flat glass	\$74.18	\$481	15.4%
Primary aluminum	\$263.04	\$2,900	9.1%
Virgin steel	\$78.45	\$900	8.7%
Recycled steel	\$47.64	\$900	5.3%
Copper	\$154.91	\$9,200	1.7%

## Manufactured Good: EV Battery Pack

	Electricity Carbon Intensity (g/kWh)	Process Heat Carbon Intensity (g/kWh)	Embedded Carbon per 100 kWh battery, tonnes	CBAM, \$/tonne	Carbon Differential for CBAM Assessment
China	660	320	8.4	\$60	267.4
U.S. (TN)	265	180	3.9		
<b>CBAM Assessment on PRC Origin 100 kWh Battery Pack</b>					<b>\$267</b>



Source:  
<https://www.greencarcongress.com/2020/10/20201022-hummerev.html>


*Basic Materials and EV battery pack embedded energy calculations shown in Appendix slides*




# How Fast Could China Potentially Adapt Its Energy System?

# Major Uncertainty For China's Electricity Evolution...But Coal Hard to Dislodge

## China Electricity Production, By Source, 2008-2030 (TWh)



## Projected Coal Power Plant Additions, By Country (MW)



Source: Global Energy Monitor, Authors' Analysis

Source: China Electricity Council, Gov't Targets, Authors' Analysis


Finally, beware of potential disparity between plant capacity and actual coal use

GW installed	Utilization Rate	Annual Coal Use, Billion Tonnes
1,500	45%	1.77
1,200	50%	1.58
1,000	65%	1.71
800	85%	1.79

# Substantial Uncertainty For Alternative, Non-Electric Industrial Energy As Well


## China Natural Gas Supply, Million Tonnes/Yr

Gas would be a logical non-coal industrial process heat source...



Imports as % of Total Supply


...But import dependency is likely to rise, and would rise faster with a more decisive shift away from coal



## U.S. coal consumption by major end users, 1950-2020

million short tons

...And changing industrial heat sources is a multi-decade process that in USA was facilitated by gas abundance post-WWII



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, *Monthly Energy Review*, Table 6.2, May 2021, preliminary data for 2020



Note: Coke plants are industrial coking coal plants; other industrial includes all other, non-coking coal industry use.


# Potential Domestic Pitfalls




Author's driveway during Great Texas Blackout, February 2021, Houston, TX

# Energy Abundance Underpins U.S. Quality of Life

## U.S. Historical Energy Use, MMBTU Per Capita




## 155 Years of U.S. Primary Energy Use Shifts, Exajoules




Source: EIA, Author's Analysis

# Avoiding Energy Monoculture: Source Diversity Promotes Reliability

## February 2011, ERCOT Generation, 15-min Intervals, MWh




## February 2021, Same



Source: ERCOT, Author's Analysis


# Energy Insecurity Can Undermine Climate Goals

## Change in Global Energy Consumption By Source (Quadrillion BTU)



Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, Author's Analysis

## Wyoming Coal production (Million Tonnes)



Source: Wyoming State Geological Survey



**A quadrillion BTU is equivalent to the gasoline usage of 11 million large V8-powered pickups or SUVs each driving 12,000 miles per year.**

# Concluding Thoughts





# Where Could I Be Wrong on China?


## 1. China Unleashes Another Round of Cement and Steel Growth



## 2. China Overcomes/Avoids Demographic Crisis



## 3. China Defies Debt Burdens and Unleashes Consumer-Led Growth




- China's consumers have increasingly turned to debt
- Does U.S. begin to pull back from QE amidst inflation?
- "China Dream" vs. "□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □"

# Thank you!

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# *Supplemental Slides*

# *Last 10 Years Mark a Key Inflection Point: China Now Global CO2 Leader on Flow AND Stock Basis*



# Appendix 1: Basic Materials Embedded Energy

Embodied Energy												
	kbtu/lb	MJ/kg	kbtu/tonne	kWh/tonne	Elec % of input energy	Electricity Used Per Tonne, kWh	China Carbon Intensity of Electricity, g/kWh	US Carbon Intensity of Electricity	China Excess Carbon Emissions, g/tonne material produced	China Excess Carbon Emissions, tonne/tonne material produced	Carbon Tax, \$/tonne	CBAM Payable Per Tonne of Material Imported
Flat glass	11		23,362	6,847	28%	1,942	660	377	549,542	0.55	\$60	\$32.97
Virgin steel	10		22,944	6,724	38%	2,560	660	377	724,474	0.72	\$60	\$43.47
Primary aluminum	29		64,335	18,855	65%	12,198	660	377	3,451,916	3.45	\$60	\$207.11
Copper	19		41,347	12,118	51%	6,191	660	377	1,752,095	1.75	\$60	\$105.13
Recycled steel		10.1		2,806	100%	2,806	660	377	793,972	0.79	\$60	\$47.64
						Other Primary Energy/Tonne, kWh	Coal Process Heat, g/CO2 per kWh	Gas Process Heat, g/CO2 per kWh	China Excess Carbon Emissions, g/tonne material produced	China Excess Carbon Emissions, tonne/tonne material produced	Carbon Tax, \$/tonne	CBAM Payable Per Tonne of Material Imported
Flat glass						4,905	320	180	686,740	0.69	\$60	\$41.20
Virgin steel						4,164	320	180	583,019	0.58	\$60	\$34.98
Primary aluminum						6,658	320	180	932,100	0.93	\$60	\$55.93
Copper						5,927	320	180	829,776	0.83	\$60	\$49.79
Recycled steel						0	320	180	0	0.00	\$60	\$0.00

Sources: Dixit et.al, "Environ. Sci. Technol. 2015, 49, 3, 1936–1945, January 5, 2015

<https://doi.org/10.1021/es503896v> ; Embodied Energy Coefficients – Alphabetical, <https://www.wgtn.ac.nz/architecture/centres/cbpr/resources/pdfs/ee-coefficients.pdf>

# Appendix 2: EV Battery Embedded Energy

	MJ		kWh	
	Electricity	Fuel	Electricity	Fuel
Aluminum	101.0	50.8	28.1	14.1
Cell production	29.9	140.0	8.3	38.9
Copper	7.3	13.7	2.0	3.8
Electrolyte solvents	0.8	11.5	0.2	3.2
Electronic parts	36.1	25.1	10.0	7.0
Graphite/carbon	17.9	6.6	5.0	1.8
LiPF6	9.6	0.0	2.7	0.0
NMC111 Precursors	17.4	57.7	4.8	16.0
NMC111 Production	44.5	75.2	12.4	20.9
Others	2.8	7.9	0.8	2.2
Plastics	0.6	1.5	0.2	0.4
Total	267.9	390.0	74.4	108.3
Total	<b>657.9</b>		<b>182.8</b>	
			<b>41%</b>	<b>59%</b>

NMC111 battery pack embedded energy per kWh of battery capacity (kWh)	183
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	Electricity Carbon Intensity (g/kWh)	Process Heat Carbon Intensity (g/kWh)	Embedded Carbon per 100 kWh battery, tonnes	CBAM, \$/tonne	Carbon Differential for CBAM Assessment
China	660	320	8.4	<b>\$60</b>	267.4
U.S. (TN)	265	180	3.9		
<b>CBAM Assessment on PRC Origin 100 kWh Battery Pack</b>					<b>\$267</b>

Sources: Dai, Q.; Kelly, J.C.; Gaines, L.; Wang, M. Life Cycle Analysis of Lithium-Ion Batteries for Automotive Applications. Batteries 2019, 5, 48; EIA/BP Statistical Review of World Energy/Author's Estimates (carbon intensity of electricity), EIA, [https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/co2\\_vol\\_mass.php](https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/co2_vol_mass.php) (carbon intensity of process heat)